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INTRODUCTION
The questions surrounding the regulation of online hatred have become progressively more 
significant over the last twenty years because of the growing presence of the internet in our 
professional, social, and private lives. The extensive use of social networking sites such as Twitter 
and Facebook, as well as our mounting utilization of online discussion forums and comments 
sections in newspapers, have led to a vast increase in the amount of ways in which cyberhate can 
now be perpetrated. 
It is important at the outset to start with some important definitions. Cyberhate will be 
taken to mean the use of electronic communications to express in written form hateful comments, 
insults, or discriminatory remarks about a person or group of persons based on, for example, their 
race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or transgender identity. This will incorporate all 
written content, including images such as memes, but will not include any forms of Voice over IP or 
instant messaging. It is important to state that ‘cyberhate’ is distinct from broader conceptions of 
‘hate crime’, although it should be noted that certain forms of cyberhate might also be classified as a 
type of hate crime. 
This chapter will consider the issue of cyberhate from the point of view of legal regulation. It 
will explore the particular challenges that globalization poses to the combating of online hatred 
effectively, and it will determine what the global response to cyberhate should be. First it will discuss 
the ways in which the legal regulation of hate speech online differs from the regulation of ‘offline’ 
hate speech. Then it will reflect on how globalization poses additional challenges to legal responses 
to online hatred. The third section will evaluate the current international response to cyberhate and 
will conclude with some suggestions for ways forward. The chapter argues that the issues 
surrounding freedom of speech and the harm caused by cyberhate need to be reconsidered in light 
of the way in which online hatred is committed. It will also suggest that a united global response is 
the most effective way to progress, while acknowledging that differing cultural and legal norms 
make this a slow and difficult process. 
ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE 
The first issue of vital importance is the need to justify, from a principled point of view, the 
criminalization of online hate speech. This is because if a state or international body proposes the 
creation of a new piece of legislation or legal framework, it needs to be demonstrated that there is a 
strong case in favour of using the law to prohibit such behaviour. Traditionally, J.S. Mill’s (1991) 
notion of ‘harm’ has been used as a guiding principle, which stipulates that the criminal law should 
only be used to prohibit behaviour if it can be shown to cause ‘harm’ to others. Mill’s ‘harm’ 
principle has been subjected to a number of criticisms and modifications over the years, but has had 
enduring appeal for many contemporary legal philosophers (e.g., Raz 1986). By contrast, legal 
moralists believe that a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for criminalization is that the 
underlying behaviour which the law aims to prohibit is morally ‘wrong’ (e.g., Finnis 1980). Within 
both schools of thought, views differ as to the essential qualities of ‘harm’ or ‘wrongfulness’. For the 
purposes of a discussion on cyberhate, what this debate demonstrates is the need to articulate 
clearly the underlying ‘harm’ or ‘wrong’ which a particular piece of legislation seeks to outlaw.1 
Identifying the harm caused by hate speech is also important in that it will enable states to 
ensure that any legal response constitutes a legitimate incursion into free speech. The issue of free 
speech is central to the debate on cyberhate. Free speech lies at the core of our democratic society 
for a number of reasons and is regarded as protection against abuse of power. J.S. Mill (1991: 20) in 
On Liberty wrote about the need for democratic states to ensure ‘the fullest liberty of professing and 
discussing … any doctrine’. Such a right exists in most modern democratic states albeit in different 
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forms such as for example the First Amendment under the US Constitution or Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). However, the right to freedom of expression is not 
absolute. J.S. Mill himself acknowledged that ‘… even opinions lose their immunity, when the 
circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute … a positive instigation to some 
mischievous act’ (1991: 56). As such, the right to freedom of expression can be restricted under 
certain conditions. Regulating hate speech is a prima facie violation of freedom of expression, and 
there has been a wide-ranging debate amongst hate crime scholars about the extent to which hate 
crimes are compatible with free speech (e.g., Blazak 2011) and a similar discussion has been 
undertaken by scholars on the relationship between hate speech and freedom of speech (e.g., 
Waldron 2012). The most commonly used argument is that the regulation of hate speech can be 
justified if to do so is warranted by the level of harm caused by the speech. Thus, this is an additional 
reason as to why it is imperative at the outset of a discussion of the regulation of cyberhate to have 
a clear understanding of the harm caused by online hate speech. 
To some extent, the discussion about the harm in online hate speech will mirror the ongoing 
debate that hate crime scholars engage in when attempting to identify why hate crime or hate 
speech should be prohibited. Two particular explanations stand out as they have been very 
influential in the development of hate crime legislation. The first is that the harm lies in the fact that 
victims of hate crime ‘hurt more’ (Iganski 2001) and/or hate crime offenders are more blameworthy 
because of their bias motivation (Lawrence 2002). The second is that the harm in hate speech lies in 
the damage to public order or in the fact that it ‘pollutes’ the sense of security in the public space we 
all inhabit (Waldron 2012). Conceptualizing the harm of hate crime and hate speech along these 
lines results in two sets of distinctions being made: the first is between the personal and the 
impersonal, and the second is between the public and the private. If the harm in hate crime lies in 
the greater harm caused to the individual because of the offender’s motivation, then hate crime 
legislation needs to reflect this. This results in legislation that treats hate crime as a problem that is 
personal to the victim, rather than an impersonal harm which is directed in a more abstract sense at 
a group of people. Meanwhile, if the harm in hate speech lies in the pollution of the public space or 
in the threat to public security and peace, legislation will focus primarily on protecting the public 
arena and will not be concerned with the exclusively private domain. 
In some jurisdictions, these distinctions are intrinsic to the legal framework on hate speech. 
For example, in England and Wales the existing legislation which can be used in cases involving 
cyberhate can be divided broadly along the personal/impersonal divide and the public/private 
divide. On the one hand there are the offences under the Malicious Communications Act 1988, the 
Communications Act 2003, and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 which are aimed at 
protecting the individual from behaviour that has caused the recipient or was meant to cause them 
harassment, alarm, distress, annoyance, inconvenience, or anxiety, such as an email sent to the 
victim threatening to assault them because they are Muslim. These offences are designed to deal 
with targeted attacks on individuals and are not aimed at impersonal attacks. On the other hand, the 
offences under the Public Order Act 1986 make it an offence to stir up hatred on the grounds of 
race, religion, or sexual orientation. An example that would fall under these provisions would be 
displaying in a public place a poster encouraging the killing of gay people. These provisions are 
aimed at regulating speech which is deemed to be a threat to public disorder as s 18(2) stipulates 
that these measures do not apply to speech that is expressed in a dwelling, or to speech that is only 
seen or heard by someone in a dwelling. Thus, the Act makes a distinction between words expressed 
in a home, and those expressed outside a home. The speech does not have to be aimed at anyone 
personally, and can be an impersonal attack on a group of people. This pattern can be seen in 
legislation in other countries as well. For instance, in the US there is a raft of state legislation which 
can give protection to individual victims of hate such as where threats have been made to the victim 
personally, or the behaviour is covered by stalking and harassment charges (Citron 2014: 123–5). 
Meanwhile the Supreme Court allows for the existence of hate speech laws as long as they only 
cover ‘fighting words’ (Chaplinsky v New Hampshire) which threaten public security by inciting 
imminent lawlessness (Brandenburg v Ohio). 
Undoubtedly some online hate speech will fall into the category of either personal attacks or 
public incitement, and so would potentially be covered by the relevant legislation. However, not all 
hate speech appearing on the internet will fall neatly into this divide. This is because the nature of 
the internet and the way it is used challenges the traditional divisions between personal/impersonal 
and public/private. Thus, there is a need for the law to reconceptualize the notion of the harm 
caused by cyberhate in order to inform legal reform in this area, both at an international level and at 
a local level. 
The distinction made between public and private discourse by the law is fundamentally 
challenged by the way in which the internet functions. Whilst some operations are clearly private—
such as emails—what constitutes a ‘public’ space on the internet is harder to identify clearly. As 
already noted, under English and Welsh law, activities which take place in the ‘home’ are not 
covered by the public order offences (Public Order Act, s 18(2)). In other countries such as Canada a 
‘private conversation’ is exempt from the provisions (s 319(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code). 
Nevertheless, at a very basic level, these distinctions between a private/public space will not work 
for the internet given that online hate speech can be written by someone in their home, and read by 
someone else in their home on the other side of the globe. Similarly, identifying what constitutes a 
‘private conversation’ on the internet is not straightforward as different levels of privacy are 
expected depending on which internet service is being used. For example, whether a conversation 
over Twitter or Facebook or in private chatrooms is public or private may depend on the number of 
people involved, as well as the privacy settings adopted by different users. We may find it easy to 
argue that an online newspaper available to all without subscription is public, but there may be 
much disagreement about whether or not this is also true of all freely available websites, including 
blogs. In an era when there are serious concerns over government surveillance of the internet, it is 
problematic to suggest that all content available on the internet should fall into the public domain. 
From a legal point of view, this requires some thought. Jeremy Waldron in his book The 
Harm in Hate Speech (2012) sets out some persuasive arguments in favour of prohibiting hate 
speech. He likens the harm in hate speech to pollution that contaminates the environment and 
poisons the atmosphere. Hate speech, he argues, undermines the dignity of those who are targeted, 
and weakens their ability to be treated as equals. For this reason, he argues, prohibiting hate speech 
is a legitimate incursion on freedom of expression. To illustrate this, he gives the example of a 
Muslim father who walks his children to school, and on the way he is confronted by posters with 
Islamophobic slogans, such as ‘Muslims and 9/11! Don’t serve them, don’t speak to them, and don’t 
let them in’ (Waldron 2012: 1). These posters make him and his children feel unwelcome and 
threatened. This is a powerful image and demonstrates well how hate speech can deeply affect the 
daily lives of citizens. However, in order to employ these arguments to justify infringing free speech 
by regulating cyberhate, a further explanation is required because of some crucial differences 
between the online and offline world. 
To begin with, as already argued, the ‘public’ space as defined in the physical world is more 
limited in scope and so, therefore, it is easier to defend placing restrictions on free speech. It is much 
harder to rationalize such curbs on our freedom when it involves our online behaviour which is now 
integral to our everyday lives. In fact, research suggests that young people see little difference in 
their online and offline identities, often making no distinction between the two (Miller 2013). 
Another difference lies in the way in which we come across material on the internet and the fact 
that we have varying degrees of control over what we encounter online. Whilst it might be possible 
to avoid looking at racist websites by not searching for them, or by not clicking on the relevant link if 
you accidentally come across them whilst searching for something else, there will be some situations 
where a user comes across hateful content whilst using a website that they have a reasonable 
expectation will not publish this sort of material, such as for example on the comments sections of 
an online newspaper. Interestingly, researchers have found that contrary to expectations, even on 
social media websites such as Facebook, users come across a substantial amount of ideologically 
diverse material (Bakshy et al. 2014). This suggests that we have less control over the content we 
encounter on social media than we would expect. Consequently, it might be necessary to consider a 
more nuanced approach to online hatred whereby differing levels of responsibility exist depending 
on the context. For instance, we might wish to impose an obligation on certain websites to police 
their online content, but might not want to necessarily extend this responsibility to all websites for 
fear that this would infringe free speech. 
These fundamental differences between the online and offline world have profound 
implications for the debate surrounding the regulation of the internet. It means that we cannot 
simply rely on the same arguments used by scholars in favour of banning hate speech, such as those 
employed by Waldron. It also means that we have to go much further in giving particular thought to 
how we use the internet, how hate speech online is viewed and by whom, and consequently where 
its harm lies. A salutary illustration of the importance of constructing clear arguments in relation to 
free speech is the recent repeal of s 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act. This made it an offence to 
communicate via the internet any ‘undertaking . . . that is likely to expose a person or persons to 
hatred or contempt’. In its original form, s 13 applied only to telecommunications, and the 
infringement on free speech had been deemed legitimate and constitutional by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v Taylor. However, after s 13 was extended to 
undertakings over the internet in 2001, this initiated a very public debate about the constitutionality 
of s 13. Concerns were expressed, particularly over the freedom of the press (Walker 2013), and 
ultimately the pro-free speech arguments were deemed to be stronger and s 13 was finally repealed 
in 2013 (c. 37, s 2). 
The impersonal/personal distinction that is usual in hate crime legislation might also not 
work as well when applied to hateful content on the internet. Whilst attacks on an individual by 
email or targeted attacks on Twitter could fall foul of offences which deal with injury caused to the 
victim, there may well be other ways in which hate perpetrated over the internet has far-reaching 
consequences that extend beyond harm to a particular individual. For example, Perry and Olsson 
(2009) have argued that the internet provides those who belong to groups we might broadly define 
as ones peddling ‘hate’ with the opportunity to ‘retrench and reinvent … as a viable collective’ 
(<IBT>Perry and Olsson 2009: 185</IBT>). It allows them to establish a collective identity and, Perry 
and Olsson argue, could potentially lead to a ‘global racist subculture’ (ibid). The permanency of the 
material that appears on the internet also contributes to this. As these hateful messages can be read 
by anyone at any time, this means that hate on the internet transcends the victim/perpetrator 
model, and instead can help create a wider global hate environment. It could, therefore, be said that 
the harm in hate speech over the internet is not limited to the injury it causes to an individual but 
also lies in the damage it causes to the social fabric of our global society by bolstering and 
intensifying certain hate movements. This aspect of cyberhate is not currently given enough 
attention by the law. 
Another characteristic of internet use that has important implications for cyberhate 
legislation is the dichotomy between on the one hand the ease with which comments can be 
published on the internet, and on the other the permanent nature of internet publication along with 
its global reach. This presents a difficult dilemma for legislators. The casual nature of much internet 
‘chatter’ presents a challenge to legal regulation as these types of comments may lack the intention 
usually necessary for hate speech. This has led commentators such as Rowbottom (2012) to caution 
against the over-criminalization of low-level online speech. Notwithstanding, even if an intention to 
cause injury may be lacking in many such cases, the harm caused can nevertheless be considerable 
(Fearn 2014). It is also a paradox of internet use that even though the reach of the internet is much 
more extensive than traditional forms of print media, the regulation, whether legal or non-legal, is 
minimal in comparison. Newspaper editors, for example, will take carefully considered decisions 
about what material to include in their newspaper. Meanwhile, the internet makes it possible for 
anyone to easily disseminate to the public their views and ideas through a number of means such as 
the creation of blogs, by posting comments at the end of newspaper articles, or via social media. 
This means that those thoughts and ideas are not necessarily well-thought out, and can be 
intemperate and uncontrolled. This lack of restraint or self-regulation means that speech that in the 
past would not have been published by traditional print media is now available to all. The internet 
can also embolden those who would never threaten or attack another person in the physical world 
to do so online. This has led to a worrying increase in the number of people, particularly women, 
who have been subjected to online abuse, harassment, or threats. The European Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA) found in a gender-based violence against women survey that one in ten 
women in the European Union (EU) said they had been the victim of cyber harassment since the age 
of 15, and it was found that ‘cyber harassment’ was the most common form of harassment that 
women had experienced in the twelve-month period running up to the survey (<IBT>FRA 
2013</IBT>). It also found that young women were most at risk of being targeted in this way (ibid). 
FRA’s survey of discrimination and hate crime against Jews also found that 10 per cent of Jews said 
they had experienced offensive or threatening anti-Semitic comments made about them online 
(ibid). Meanwhile, the American Association of University Women surveyed almost 2,000 students in 
2010–11 and found that 30 per cent of them said they had experienced some form of online 
harassment (Citron 2014: 16). 
This discussion highlights the fact that relying on traditional measures used to combat hate 
crime is not sufficient, and there is a need for specific legislation aimed at targeting digital hate 
crime (see also Guichard 2009). A large part of the legislative exercise will require a reconsideration 
of free speech in light of the points made above about the challenges of cyberhate. In the context of 
‘offline’ hate crime and hate speech, this debate has been characterized by interplay between two 
important values: on the one hand there is the important democratic value of freedom of speech, 
and on the other there is the equally important concept of equality. Hate crime legislation is seen as 
an important tool in the push towards equality, but this necessarily entails an incursion on our 
freedom of expression. Citron (2014) and Brennan (2009) have both argued that when considering 
the extent to which an infringement on freedom of speech is justified by legal regulation of 
cyberhate, more emphasis should be placed on the concept of equality. Citron (2014) has explored 
cyberhate in depth and has focused particularly on the way in which women are exposed to hate 
online, and how this affects their ability to participate fully in society and thereby threatens the 
principle of equality. She outlines a number of examples of cyberhate attacks where women have 
abandoned their online presence as a consequence. Citron views this as an affront to civil liberties as 
these attacks hinder women from enjoying their right to access to education and employment. This 
illustrates how in the context of the discussion of online regulation, it is wrong to assume that the 
relationship between free speech and equality is mutually exclusive whereby any step towards 
greater equality necessarily involves an incursion into free speech. This is because in many instances, 
online regulation of hateful messages may in fact help preserve free speech rather than diminish it. 
If the internet is meant to be a platform for free speech, then this has to apply equally to all groups 
in society. If cyberhate is impeding this, then legal regulation must be employed to even the scales. 
TECHNICAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES 
Having looked at some of the issues of principle pertaining to online hate crime, it is necessary next 
to consider some of the technical and practical concerns regarding the legislative response to 
cyberhate. These relate in particular to the international nature of the internet given that 
globalization poses a number of difficulties to the legal regulation of cyberhate. These challenges are 
of particular importance as they indicate that ordinary criminal offences such as those relating to 
harassment or stalking are not sufficient to deal with online hatred, and that what is needed instead 
is a legal response which is more tailored to the specific requirements of cyberhate. 
The first challenge relates to the global nature of cyberhate. Unlike most ‘ordinary’ hate 
crime which is perpetrated by offenders who live in the same jurisdiction as the victims, online 
hatred can be carried out by offenders who live in a different country or even a different continent 
to their victim. This transnational nature of online hate crime generates a number of problems from 
a legal perspective. First, it would be necessary to decide which jurisdiction has authority to punish 
the perpetrator’s actions. From the victim’s point of view, there are disadvantages whatever the 
outcome. If jurisdiction lies with the perpetrator’s legal system, the victim will encounter a number 
of potential hurdles when attempting to access justice in a foreign country. There may be no existing 
legislation in the perpetrator’s legal system that covers the offending behaviour, and even if there is, 
there may be obvious cultural, linguistic, logistical, and financial difficulties which would confront 
the victim who is attempting to persuade the police in another country to take their case forward. If 
jurisdiction lies with the victim’s legal system, justice can only be achieved if the perpetrator is 
extradited to the victim’s country. Inevitably, this will not be straightforward as extradition treaties 
are neither universal nor comprehensive, and so there is no guarantee that a victim will find it easy 
to bring a perpetrator to court. This illustrates how cooperation between states is required. The 
international harmonization of laws relating to cyberhate, as well as effective extradition treaties, 
would go some way to solving these difficulties. 
In practice, though, this is likely to be very difficult to achieve as different cultural and legal 
traditions across the world act as an enormous stumbling block to harmonization. For example, the 
US approach to free speech is very different to that of the ECHR. The US First Amendment right to 
free speech is framed in absolutist terms. This means that although in practice exceptions to the 
First Amendment do exist (Citron 2014), the rhetoric surrounding free speech is that of assertive 
guardianship. By contrast, freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR is given protection 
subject to certain limitations. This has meant that the US has traditionally been less open to 
persuasion when drafting laws that may infringe freedom of speech. The divergence in approach to 
free speech extends beyond the US and Europe. Countries at different stages of political 
development will also have distinct needs in relation to the balance that needs to be struck between 
free speech and cyberhate. Whilst it could be argued that that the political development of Western 
liberal democracies allows for greater restrictions on free speech (Waldron 2012), other emerging 
nations might still require the scales to be balanced more in favour of free speech (Gagliardone et al. 
2014). Given the importance of international cooperation and the crucial role the US would play in 
this, international agreement on cyberhate legislation appears a long way off (Banks 2011). 
One particular practical difficulty associated with the regulation of cyberhate relates to the 
anonymity of the internet. Even if we were able to achieve international harmonization of laws and 
broker far-reaching extradition treaties, these will only be effective if it is possible to identify and 
track down the perpetrators. This is not necessarily straightforward given the ease with which it is 
possible to conceal one’s identity online. Email accounts can be obtained using false information, 
and software is available that allows a user to hide the origin of an email or their physical location. 
Once a false email has been obtained, a perpetrator is able to join discussion groups, chat forums, 
and social media without their true identity becoming known to the victim. In countries where 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) do not provide anonymous accounts it is possible, in principle, to 
obtain the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of a perpetrator’s computer, and thus track down the 
physical location of the computer which was used to carry out the attack. However, ISPs do not give 
out IP addresses easily and will often only do so under a court order. In the US, the courts have 
allowed ‘John Doe subpoenas’2 to be issued to a website or an ISP in order to compel the handing 
over of details of a particular poster in cases involving civil claims (Citron 2014: 223). Currently there 
is no similar provision in relation to criminal claims, and so these subpoenas are of limited use in 
most cyberhate cases which are better tackled through the criminal law. 
A further problem is the issue of policing. It is imperative that any regulatory regime can be 
policed effectively if we are to justify the use of the criminal law and criminal punishment. Packer 
(1968) argues that one of the pre-conditions for the legitimate use of the criminal law is if doing so 
will not expose that process to severe qualitative and quantitative strains. This is a particular 
challenge for the policing of cyberhate given the scale and complexity of the internet. It is important 
to note, though, that the predominant role of the police with regard to cyberhate is to respond to 
complaints by individual victims, and not to police the entire World Wide Web. Thus, the police need 
to be given the appropriate tools and resources to deal effectively with individual incidences of 
cyberhate that are brought to their attention, but they do not need to be given the power or 
responsibility to regulate all online content. Coliandris (2012) suggests that a Problem-Oriented 
Policing (POP) approach would be necessary so as to identify the root cause of the behaviour before 
finding effective measures to deal with it. Clearly, there is still much work to be done to identify and 
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 These subpoenas enable a plaintiff to file suit even if they do not yet know the identity of the defendant. 
develop best practice in this area and this will require a deep dialogue between governments, the 
security services, the police, and academics. 
A combination of the global reach of the internet, the problems regarding policing, the 
difficulties surrounding international agreement over free speech, and the complications posed by 
anonymity, forces us to consider whether the responsibility for online hatred needs to be shifted to, 
or at least shared by ISPs. The current situation means that many victims of online hatred face 
considerable difficulties in locating their assailant, and even greater problems with bringing them to 
justice. In such cases, where tracing an offender is too complicated either because of geographical 
impediments or because of technical difficulties in identifying them, an alternative solution for the 
victim would be to force ISPs to take responsibility for policing their websites. This already happens 
in cases involving defamation in English law. Under s 5 of the Defamation Act 2013, website 
operators are given a defence to defamation claims if they comply with certain procedures. Thus, if 
they are able to show that they provided the complainant with sufficient details of the poster’s 
identity which would enable them to bring proceedings against them, or they took down the 
offending material when asked to by the complainant, they will have a defence in law under s 5(3) of 
the Defamation Act 2013. Although there is no direct legal obligation on websites to provide 
identification information, or to take down offending speech, there is a very strong incentive for 
them to do so in cases involving defamation. It is too soon to evaluate the effectiveness of s 5, and 
its success depends on how clear the accompanying regulations prove to be. Arguably it is not an 
excessively onerous responsibility on ISPs, but the issue does raise broader questions about the 
importance of privacy on the internet. At a time when tensions are running high over state 
surveillance of internet communications both in the United States and elsewhere, any obligation on 
ISPs to hand over personal information to the authorities will have to be carefully worded in order to 
ensure this does not breach privacy rights. The main concern has been with unlimited and 
indiscriminate surveillance (e.g., UN 2013) and so it would be possible for similar criminal provisions 
to be drafted narrowly enough to strike a balance between freedom of speech and privacy rights on 
the one hand, and the right of victims of cyberhate to achieve justice by resolving some of the 
difficulties surrounding anonymity on the other. 
Another important part of the solution to cyberhate will be a continuation and 
intensification of the informal techniques that already take place. Currently, there is a proliferation 
of different approaches that attempt to help solve the problem of online hatred in an informal non-
legal way. For instance, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) has produced a set of best practices 
which guide providers and the internet community on how best to tackle online hatred (ADL 2014). 
The emphasis is on cooperation by industry providers such as through the voluntary enforcement of 
terms of service and the provision of effective mechanisms for reporting and removing offensive 
comments (ADL 2015). There is a concern that over-reliance on private contractors to deal with 
cyberhate essentially gives those companies the power to make decisions on free speech, but 
equally, as a recent report by UNESCO on online hatred points out ‘focusing exclusively on repressive 
measures can miss the complexity of a phenomenon that is still poorly understood and which calls 
out for tailored and coordinated responses from a range of different actors in society’ (Gagliardone 
et al. 2015: 53). Other initiatives, such as Belgium’s ‘Stop Hate’ website aims to give parents, 
teenagers, and teachers information and support on how to recognize and combat online hatred. 
The Council of Europe’s ‘Young People Combating Hate Speech Online’ campaign has also sought to 
mobilize young people from around Europe to take a proactive stance against hate speech they 
confront online. 
The globalization of online hatred means that in order to achieve the most effective 
response, international cooperation is required. However, this is not an easy solution as attempting 
to reach a consistent approach across different countries with vastly different legal systems and 
cultural approaches to issues such as free speech has proven to be very difficult. This will become 
clear in the following section which evaluates the attempts made so far at international 
collaboration. Nevertheless, the globalization of cyberhate also requires us to consider refocusing 
attention on those who enable it, rather than adopting a traditional response which concentrates on 
the perpetrators of hate. This corroborates the argument put forward in the first section above that 
we need to design a specific response to online hatred that requires us to think beyond the 
traditional measures usually adopted to combat physical hate crimes. 
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
At the global level, there has been a concerted effort over a number of years to establish a cohesive 
international response to hate crime. Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination both call on states to outlaw any dissemination or advocacy which incites 
discrimination or violence. The provisions in both articles are couched widely enough that legislation 
outlawing hate speech online (subject to freedom of expression) could be included. However, online 
hatred is not specifically mentioned, and so no guidance is provided on how these prohibitions 
would operate in relation to cyberhate. At the EU level, the EU Framework Decision on combating 
certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of the criminal law requires 
states to harmonize their laws on racism and xenophobia. Whilst all of these initiatives constitute a 
constructive approach to hate crime, they do not provide a solution to any of the particular 
problems relating to online hatred outlined in the previous two sections. By the same token, the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has produced under its Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) a Practical Guide (2009) which provides a very 
useful framework for hate crime legislation, but it is less concerned with hate speech. Its 
recommendations will only apply to online hatred which falls into the category of an already existing 
criminal offence and, as such, they are of limited use to a wider discussion on cyberhate which seeks 
to establish both a reconceptualization of traditional notions of harm and a practical solution to 
some of the particular problems associated with digital hate speech. Thus, the current approach 
which subsumes cyberhate within the broader problem of hate crime is ultimately insufficient. 
The only international agreement targeted expressly at online hate is the Council of Europe’s 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime concerning the criminalization of acts of a 
racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems. To date, the Protocol has had 
limited success due to the reluctance by a number of states, such as the US, Russia, Turkey, Sweden, 
and the UK to ratify it. Brennan (2009) has written in detail about the shortcomings of the Protocol 
and she has argued that, even if ratified by a state, it is too narrow a document to provide an 
effective response to online hatred. She identifies a number of defects with the Protocol such as the 
reference to ‘intention’ which potentially limits the extent to which ISPs can be held liable for 
publishing hate material online, and the free speech exception under Article 3(3) which allows states 
to not implement cyberhate measures even if they ratify the Protocol. Furthermore, she contends 
that the emphasis on free speech undermines the underlying objectives of the Protocol, and she 
argues that more weight should instead be placed on the concept of equality and non-discrimination 
which states are under a duty to promote. 
The legislative response to hate crime at the international level, does, therefore, appear to 
be insufficient. Nevertheless, there is a growing recognition that cyberhate should be treated as a 
distinct category of hate crime which requires special attention. For example, the report by the EU 
into the implementation of its Framework Decision points out that: ‘[d]ue to its special character, 
including the difficulty of identifying the authors of illegal online content and removing such content, 
hate speech on the internet creates special demands on law enforcement and judicial authorities in 
terms of expertise, resources and the need for cross-border cooperation’ (European Commission 
2014: para. 4). 
Meanwhile, the working group on cyberhate at the EU Agency FRA conference on Hate 
Crime in 2013 considered the need for a targeted legislative approach to cyberhate (FRA 2013). In 
parallel to this, civil society groups have already taken steps to combat cyberhate as a discrete 
problem. The ADL treats cyberhate as a specific policy area, and has implemented a number of 
initiatives to combat online hatred such as the Cyber-Safety Action Guide which aims to provide 
internet users with a simple way of registering any hatred they find online. The International 
Network against Cyberhate (INACH) aims to bring the internet in line with human rights by uniting 
organizations to tackle online hate and to raise awareness of discrimination which takes place 
online. 
CONCLUSION 
Taken together, several themes emerge from the current international and national approach to 
hate crime. The first is that we need a targeted approach to cyberhate. There are a number of ways 
in which the nature and impact of cyberhate differs from offline hate speech, and which therefore 
require us to go beyond traditional definitions of harm to capture the complex and subtle 
distinctiveness of the damage caused by online hatred. Particular attention needs to be paid to the 
fact that online interactions between individuals can bolster hate movements, whilst the prevalence 
of online hatred on heavily used websites, such as online newspapers, may impact certain groups 
and affect their ability to enjoy the internet. In addition to this, more thought needs to be given to 
adopting a more nuanced approach to the concept of what constitutes a ‘public’ space on the 
internet. Finally, there will need to be a recognition that freedom of speech arguments need to be 
reconsidered in light of the harm caused by online hatred. In particular, the principle of equality as a 
competing value must be given greater attention in order to determine the correct limits of legal 
regulation. 
The second point to make is that we need a globalized approach to cyberhate. The very 
nature of internet use means that the perpetrator and the victim will not necessarily be in the same 
country, and so without an international response, victims will often find they have no legal solution 
to their problem. In addition to this, we need to hold ISPs at least partially responsible for enabling 
cyberhate that comes to their attention, and this cannot easily be achieved without an international 
response. This international response also needs to take into account the unique nature of 
cyberhate. It is not sufficient to rely on efforts that are already being made at the international level 
in relation to hate crime more generally. Cyberhate needs to become a priority policy in its own 
right. Currently, the Council of Europe’s Additional Protocol is the only international framework on 
cyberhate. Other international bodies such as the UN and the EU should reflect on the special 
requirements of online hatred as outlined in the previous paragraph, and establish agreements 
which are tailored towards the broader harm caused by cyberhate, and the need for social equality. 
Third, although an international response is the ideal, it seems unlikely that a coherent 
approach will be achieved in the short-term. In the meantime, though, there is still much that can be 
done at the national level. National governments can still achieve results by adopting effective 
legislation aimed at online hatred. It is also imperative that European states which have not already 
ratified the Council of Europe’s Additional Protocol do so because, in spite of its deficiencies, it 
signals a first step in the right direction. 
The regulation of online hate speech is still in its infancy, and a number of challenges lie 
ahead. The difficulties are undoubtedly substantial, but the problems caused by cyberhate are 
equally significant and should not be underestimated. The regulation of cyberhate needs to become 
a top priority for those with responsibility in this field as the situation is pressing and action can no 
longer be deferred. 
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